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This paper reviews the regulations governing hiring, firing, overtime work, social 
security contributions, minimum wages and collective bargaining in the region and 
examines their impact on labor market outcomes.  Using data from Latin America, 
Caribbean and OECD countries, we reach the following conclusions:  
 
•  Though the region is very diverse in its labor regulations, two polar models can be 
detected. The first one is prevalent in the Caribbean, where collective agreements 
shape the bulk of labor relations. The second characterizes the rest of the region, 
where Labor Codes are much more encompassing in the scope of matters regulated. 
Labor Codes favor indefinite, full-time labor contracts through detailed regulation of 
probationary periods, benefits, and severance payments in case of separation.  
•  Employment stability protection (including mandated severance payments and other 
regulations that penalize employment termination) in Latin America is stricter than in 
most OECD countries. 
•  For the labor market as a whole, there is robust evidence that the protection of 
employment stability is associated with a higher incidence of self-employment, and 
somewhat weaker evidence that it is associated with lower employment rates. 
•  Evidence from Chile suggests that among different groups of workers, a reduction in 
employment protection may increase the employment of young workers and women, 
but at the cost of reducing the employment rates of pre-retirement age workers.   
•  Job security increases job duration in the region: Albeit the typical worker in Latin 
America experiences shorter employment spells than an average US worker, after 
controlling for differences in education and firm size a Latin American worker 
remains longer in her job than her US counterpart.  
•  Legally mandated benefits are unequally distributed: younger, poorer, less skilled, 
and female workers have a lower likelihood of being covered by legally mandated 
benefits than their more educated, prime-age, richer and male counterparts regardless 
of the size of the firm they are employed at.  
•  In some countries in the region, high minimum wages may be generating high levels 
of youth and female unemployment. 
•  In Latin America, union membership is falling and collective bargaining coverage is 
relatively low. Collective bargaining institutions are characterized by pervasive state 
intervention that weakens the incentives for workers to organize themselves in unions 
and actively bargain over wages and benefits.  
•  If the region is to evolve away from legally mandated protection towards contractual 
arrangements arising from workplace conditions, unions and collective bargaining 
will become the central actors in the determination of wages, benefits, and protection 
levels. The State will need to change its role, and center its actions in the active 






Latin America is a region especially prone to large macroeconomic and policy shocks 
that generate a climate of uncertainty and instability. The Mexico and East Asia crisis are 
only two of the most recent examples. It is only natural that in the face of this uncertainty 
workers have demanded ways to increase income and consumption stability. In most 
countries of the region, this stability has been pursued by: (1) imposing large penalties on 
firms that dismiss workers; and (2) limiting the types of contracts that firms can offer to a 
restricted set of full-time, indefinite contracts.  
  
These regulations have come under attack as Latin American economies progress in their 
aim of becoming more market oriented. Representatives of the private sector claim the 
need of reforming the institutions and policies that govern labor markets. The existing 
institutions, they say, constrain firms from adapting to and participating in the 
increasingly integrated world markets. In the other side of the debate, workers’ 
representatives acknowledge the existence of new rules of the game, but fear that labor 
reforms are going to backfire in the form of lower wages, higher unemployment, and 
reduced social protection. 
 
As each side of the debate makes their points across, one of the most surprising things is 
the lack of reliable information in which to base decision-making. At this point, the 
available evidence regarding whether labor institutions are affecting employment and 
unemployment rates, whether it contributes to increase non-regulated employment, how it 
affects wages, and whether indeed they protect workers and whom is protected, is quite 
limited. This paper is aimed at developing some of this evidence and making explicit 
some of the dilemmas policy-makers face. 
 
The region is very diverse in its labor regulations. Two polar models can be detected: in 
the Caribbean collective agreements shape the bulk of labor relations, while in the rest of 
the region Labor Codes are much more encompassing in the scope of matters regulated. 
Labor Codes favor indefinite, full-time labor contracts through detailed regulation of 
probationary periods, benefits, and severance payments in case of separation. In almost 
all countries, temporary, fixed-term or part-time work contracts are strictly regulated and 
in some, they are prohibited. These constrains in the set of available contracts might be 
detrimental for workers that have a taste for working in a flexible manner and might be 
specially pervasive for women or young workers that would like to combine work with 
other activities.  
 
Job security provisions, like notice periods, severance payments and narrow definitions 
of just causes for dismissal, are much stricter in Latin America than in most OECD 
countries. Chile, for example, a country considered as relatively “flexible” in the Latin 
American region, has similarly strict job security provisions than Greece, considered as 
‘rigid” among the OECD countries. Three consequences emanate from the strictness of 
employment protection. 3 
 
First, there is robust evidence that the protection of employment stability is associated 
with a higher incidence of self-employment, and somewhat weaker evidence that it is 
associated with lower employment rates. These results hold true regardless of the sample 
of countries considered. In particular, similar results are encountered for the OECD, for 
Latin America and for the whole sample of countries. 
 
Secondly, evidence from Chile suggest that a reduction in employment protection may 
increase the employment of young workers and women, but at the cost of reducing the 
employment rates of pre-retirement age workers. In the short-run, the negative effect on 
older workers is likely to dominate, whereas in the longer run, increased youth 
employment can increase overall employment rates. Yet, older workers are more likely to 
be represented by unions and the political process, and hence, they are more likely to veto 
any attempts of reform. These differences in the relative impact of a labor reform may 
help to explain the scarcity of labor reform experiences in the region.  
 
And third, labor regulations have contributed to reduce turnover rates in the region, 
reducing workers’ risk of facing unemployment spells. Thus, although the typical Latin 
American worker experiences shorter employment duration than the average US worker, 
after controlling for education and firm size, a Latin American worker remains longer in 
her job than her US counterpart.  
 
Our evidence suggests that the cost of job protection regulations is the introduction of 
distortions in the composition of employment in the region. In particular, they seem to 
have increased employment for prime-age and older male workers, at the expense of 
reducing employment rates for younger and female workers. In addition, they seem to be 
increasing the number of workers that turn to self-employment. In some countries of the 
region, high minimum wages may be generating high levels of youth and female 
unemployment. Furthermore, in both large and small firms, poorer workers are less likely 
to benefit from the protection of the law, as indicated by the evasion of social security 
contributions. In summary, the current protection mechanisms are not adequate to reach 
those very workers that the law sought to protect. 
 
In this context of encompassing and extensive legally mandated protection, workers have 
little incentive to organize themselves in unions and actively bargain over wages and 
benefits. Latin America is a region characterized by relatively low, and falling, levels of 
union density, and low coverage rates of collective bargaining. Furthermore, the whole 
collective bargaining system is tainted by pervasive State intervention that reduces even 
more the incentives workers may have to participate in unions. 
 
If the region is to evolve from legally mandated protection and benefits, towards 
contractual arrangements arising from workplace conditions, the low level of 
unionization and the low coverage of collective bargaining will create an important 
obstacle. Such a transition would make unions and collective bargaining the central 
actors, and the State will need to change the focus of its activities towards actively 
promoting and protecting the freedom of organization and bargaining. 4 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review the regulation on 
dependent work in the region and examine its impact on the level, the composition, and 
the duration of employment.  In addition, we examine who is more likely to be protected 
by existing regulation. In Section 3, we examine the impact of minimum wage laws in 
nine countries of the region. In Section 4, we review the nature and behavior of collective 
bargaining institutions. Finally, Section 5 poses some issues for discussion.  
 
 
2-Regulations on Dependent Work  
 
Regulations on dependent work such as restrictions on the types of contracts available to 
hire workers, mandatory severance payments, surcharges for overtime and holiday work, 
and social security contributions were explicitly designed to increase the quality of work 
and the well-being of workers. However, at the same time, they are often blamed for 
generating “rigid” labor markets characterized by high levels of unemployment or   
“informal” work.  Thus, for example, the high rates of unemployment in continental 
Europe with respect to the US or the UK are taken as a proof that the high levels of 
protection in Europe are detrimental for employment. In the same manner, the high 
degree of informal or unprotected work is often seen as a direct consequence of  “over-
regulation” of dependent work.  
 
In this chapter, we examine the regulations governing hiring, firing, overtime work  and 
social security contributions in the region and examine its effects on employment and job 
stability. In addition, we examine whether social security and other benefits mandated by 
law are distributed equitably among dependent workers or instead some workers are more 
likely to be protected than others.  
 
2.1 The region is very diverse in its institutions 
 
A complete summary of dependent work regulations for all the countries of the Latin 
American and Caribbean region is beyond the scope of this paper
2. Nevertheless, there 
are some similarities and differences across countries that should be taken into account 
when evaluating current labor codes and its effects. 
 
Regarding contractual formulas, there are major differences between the legislation of 
Latin American countries and the English speaking Caribbean. In the former, legislation 
favors indefinite contracts and sets significant restrictions on temporary, fixed-term or 
probation contracts. In some countries, like Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala the 
legislation prohibits temporary contracts to perform “permanent activities proper to the 
company”. In others like in Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela their renewals are very 
much restricted and, in all cases, when the maximum number of renewals is reached the 
contract has to become indefinite. By contrast, in the Caribbean countries, there are 
virtually no restrictions on the renewal or applicability of these “atypical” contracts.  
                                                           
2 See IPES 96, Chapter 6 or Lora & Pages (1997) for a complete summary and discussion of dependent 
employment regulation in LAC.  5 
Since 1990 some countries like Argentina, Ecuador and Peru have introduced new 
formulas making possible to extend the duration or applicability of such contracts.  
 
Another characteristic of contractual formulas in the region is that they tend to favor full-
time contracts. Consequently, the proportion of workers voluntarily employed on part-
time bases is very small. This lack of flexibility on the number of hours worked can be 
very detrimental for workers that have a taste for working in a flexible manner or want to 
combine work with other activities.  
 
 
Regarding the regulations governing the termination of a contract, there are again large 
differences between Latin American and the English Speaking Caribbean countries. In 
the first group, labor codes are based on the principle of labor stability. This principle 
implies that once a short probatory period is over, the worker acquires rights over his or 
her job. In the event of a company-initiated separation, the worker has the right to be 
compensated for the loss of the job, or in some cases, being reinstated if a just cause for 
dismissal cannot be proved. In the Caribbean countries things are pretty different.  With 
the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, labor codes are not very specific about advance 
notification or compensation for dismissal with or without just cause. Instead, much 
leeway is left for contractual agreements between employers and employees. 
 
In the Latin American countries, labor codes distinguish between two types of 
compensation in the event a contract is terminated. The first one is the compensation for 
time of service
3, or amount paid by the firm to the worker regardless of the cause of 
separation or the party that initiated it. In general, this compensation amount is increasing 
in the workers’ tenure with the firm. This compensation is available in Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (since 1997) where a certain fraction of a workers‘ wage is 
accumulated every year in an individual worker account. This amount augmented with 
normal market yields is available to the worker, if she or he is dismissed or quits 
voluntarily. In Brazil, a fraction of the wage is also deposited every year in an individual 
worker account but the final amount is only available to the worker in case of dismissal.  
 
A second source of compensation is available to the worker when the firm initiates the 
separation. This payment is generally referred to as compensation for dismissal. Its 
amount depends on whether the separation is deemed justified in which case, might be 
zero or small, or unjustified, in which case the amount can be quite large. In principle, 
labor codes spell quite systematically the instances in which a dismissal is considered 
justified being among the common causes workers’ misdemeanors or work absenteeism. 
Except in Chile, Argentina and Peru, firms’ economic difficulties are not considered a 
just cause for dismissal.  In the event of economic hardship or the need to rationalize the 
labor force, firms have to pay the worker an amount that ranges from a half month’s pay 
per year worked in Paraguay, to two months pay in Nicaragua. In Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela, in the event of dismissal, workers receive both compensation for 
                                                           
3 This compensation takes different names around Latin America. In Peru, its name is CTS (Compensacion 
por Tiempo de Servicio). In Colombia, is  called  Severance Fund, in Brazil FGTS (Fundo de Garantia do 
Tempo de Servicio) and in Venezuela Prestacion de Antiguedad. 6 
time of service and compensation for dismissal. In Brazil, also, in the event of dismissal, 
workers receive the amount accumulated in their individual funds, plus an extra 
compensation of 40% of the accumulated funds.  
 
Besides regulating hiring and firing procedures, the typical legislation in the region 
covers limits on working hours, overtime pay, night work and holidays. As a general rule, 
the maximum period work is 48 hours a week and eight hours a day
4.  Overtime pay 
ranges from  an additional 25 % of normal wages in Colombia to 200% in Mexico after 9 
extra hours.  
 
Finally, social security systems in the region are mostly funded by taxes levied on labor 
income. These taxes are devoted to partly fund health care systems and partly to fund old-
age pensions. Given the scarce coverage and quality of benefits, social security 
contributions are in most countries perceived as taxes that neither workers nor firms want 
to bear. Social Security contributions are regarded as high in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Uruguay, whereas Caribbean and Central American countries, with the exception of 
Costa Rica, enjoy relative low social security contributions
5.  
 
In the following sections we examine the effects of these institutions on labor market 
outcomes. We focus our attention on two particular sets of regulations; (1) Employment 
protection provisions and (2) Social security contributions.  
 
2.2 –   The impact of Employment Protection 
 
Employment protection or employment security are commonly used as synonyms to 
denote the set of provisions devoted to increase employment stability.  In discussing this 
topic emotions run high, partly because the impact of these regulations on labor market 
outcomes is unclear, and partly, because any changes are likely to benefit some workers 
at the expense of others. In this section we examine the effects of the regulations 
governing dismissals on employment rates and job stability. It must be mentioned at the 
outset that this is not an easy task and our results should be taken as indicative. In the first 
place, the lack of substantial labor market reforms yields very few instances in which we 
can properly analyze the effect of institutions. Therefore, we either recur to cross section 
analysis or examine countries for which enough variability is available. Secondly, the 
concept of “rigidity” itself has taken to mean very different things creating confusion in 
the media and in the public discussion on what labor market “flexibility” is supposed to 
mean. In this study we place special emphasis in defining measures of job “rigidity” that 
can be compared over time and across countries in and outside the region. This allows us 
to judge the institutions of one country in relation to those of other countries, in ways that 




                                                           
4 This standard work week is way longer than in most of the OECD countries, where standard weeks of 38 
hours are the norm.  
5 See IPES, 96 , IADB 7 
2.2.1- Measuring “Rigidity” 
 
One of the most difficult questions when assessing the benefits or losses associated to 
labor legislation is the one associated with the measurement of protection. A 
compensation of 1 month of wage per year worked is high or low? Comparing legislation 
across countries gives a relative measure of protection, however restricting our 
comparisons to the context of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, might distort 
our views in that we take as normal, protection levels that are high compared to other 
regions.  
 
One solution is to place Latin American and Caribbean legislation in reference to the one 
existing in the OECD countries. This comparison is useful in that protection levels in the 
OECD have been widely studied. Is Latin America closer to the relatively unprotected 
US labor market, or instead, the characteristics of dependent work regulation are more 
closely related to the more protected and supposedly rigid European labor markets?  
 
One possible measure of job protection was computed by Márquez (1997) following a 
methodology developed by Grubb and Wells (1993) for the OECD countries. The index 
summarizes information on the following components of dependent work regulation: (1) 
length of probation periods; (2) advance notice periods; (3) the actual cost of dismissing a 
worker; (4) whether dismissals related to firms’ difficulties are likely to be deemed as just 
or unjust cause for dismissal; and (5) whether reinstating the worker in its job is 
mandatory once a dismissal is deemed unjust. All the institutional information used to 
elaborate this index dates back to 1990. Since there have been few labor reforms, most of 
the 1990 data is still valid today. In addition, for the few countries for which some 
reforms have been enacted, the full impact of reforms in the labor market is not likely to 
be felt until some time in the future.  
 
It should be noticed that the index
6, by construction, only gives an ordinal instead of a 
cardinal order. An index of 20 indicates that 19 countries in the sample have relatively 
lower job protection indices. In addition, the index is built by taking simple averages of 
each of the four elements described in the four first columns of Table 1. This means that 
the same importance is awarded to, say, the relative ranking regarding length of a 
probation period, than to actual dismissal costs.  
                                                           
6 To elaborate the index, pre-notice requirements are added to compensations for dismissals. However, one 
month of mandatory pre-notice counts only .75 towards the cost of dismissal. The difficulties to qualify an 
economic dismissal as just or unjust, and the requirement to reinstall a worker are classified in three levels 
ranging from 1 to 3,  the higher for the countries in which economic difficulties of the firm are considered 
unjust cause and reinstalling the worker in his or her job is mandatory.  After these manipulations of the 
initial institutional data, the four resulting components of dependent work regulation are ranked, from 1, for 
the less restrictive country, to the number that indicates the maximum number of countries for which 
information is available
6. Table 1 summarizes the relative position of each country in each of the former 
five categories. The final index is obtained averaging across the five columns for each country and ranking 
the countries again, from 1, for the country with the lower average to the maximum number of countries. 8 
Table 1: Employment protection index 
Country Definition  of 
just-cause 
for dismissal 









   1  3  10      
Argentina  27 33.5 28  30 13.5  9  14  24 
Bahamas    6.5 7 4.5  2.5  13.5   14 2 
Barbados  6.5  14.5  7  4 35 2 14 8 
Belize  6.5 7 4.5  11  33 3 14 5 
Bolivia  27 35.5 35  34 13.5  21.5 14 35.5 
Brazil  27 21 12 15  13.5 6  14 13 
Chile  27 26 33 33  13.5  11 14  25.5 
Colombia  27 28 31 35  13.5  26 14 34 
Costa  Rica  27 25 28 30  13.5  21.5  14 27 
Dom.  Rep.  27 7 4.5  2.5  13.5   14 6 
Ecuador 27 37 28 30  13.5  21.5  14 31 
El  Salvador  27 22.5 25  28 29.5  21.5 14 28.5 
Guatemala  27 17 22 26 23  21.5  14 22 
Guyana 27  14.5  13 19 35 12 14 16 
Haiti   27  7  15.5  8      12 
Honduras  27  22.5  34 32 23  21.5  14 33 
Jamaica 6.5  7 15.5 8 13.5    14  4 
Mexico  27 19 19 21 35 14  34.5  30 
Nicaragua  27 33.5 36  36  3.5 30.5 14 35.5 
Paraguay  27 24 22 20  29.5 5  14 21 
Peru  27 17 22 26  13.5  32  34.5  32 
Suriname  27  3  15.5  14  23  14  15 
T  and  T    6.5 27 22 23  29.5  16 14 17 
Uruguay    27 17 22 26  13.5  21.5  14  19.5 
Venezuela    27 30 37 37  13.5  30.5  14 37 
Belgium 6.5 31  15.5 8  6  13 14 11 
Denmark 6.5 35.5  30  16.5 13.5 7.5  29  18 
France  6.5 13  8  5  27 15 14 10 
Germany  15.5  20  9.5  13 5 17  31.5  14 
Greece 13.5  32 26 24 23 7.5  31.5  25.5 
Ireland  6.5  3  4.5 10 3.5 27 29  9 
Italy  6.5 10 18 12 32 28  34.5  19.5 
Netherlands  13.5  3  2  6 23 4 29 7 
Portugal  27 11.5 11  18 29.5  21.5  34.5 23 
Spain  15.5  29 32 22 26 29 14  28.5 
U  K  6.5 11.5 9.5 16.5  2  10  14  3 




Table 1 and Graph 1 exhibit that most countries in Latin America have high levels of 
protection even when compared to the “rigid” Mediterranean countries. Chile, for 
example, a country considered as relatively flexible in the Latin American region, has the 
same index than Greece, considered as “rigid” among the OECD countries. In the sample 
as a whole, two groups emerge. The first group is formed with the high job security 
countries and comprises most of the Latin America and Mediterranean countries. The 
second group is formed with the low job security countries and comprises the Caribbean 


























































Graph 1: Employment Protection Index
 
The former results suggest that job protection in Latin America is high. However, this 
statement per se, does not necessarily indicate that (1) labor markets are more rigid in 
Latin America, and  (2) that Latin American firms face higher dismissal costs.  
 
In first place, high dismissal costs might be combined with weak enforcement institutions 
leading to high levels of non-compliance. In such case, mandatory provisions might not 
affect average employment, although they would affect the composition of employment 
between covered or formal and uncovered or informal employment.  
 
In second place, any mandated payment can, in principle, be undone through private 
transfers between firms and workers
7. Thus, if workers agree to exchange higher future 
income, at the time of separation, for lower present wages, the expected cost of dismissal 
can be factored in lower wages.  Obviously, the fact that wages have to be positive and 
presumably larger than a certain minimum wage places a limit to this mechanism. If 
mandated payments are too high, the discount on current wages needed to keep labor 
                                                           
7 See Lazear (1990) for a discussion of this idea. 10 
costs unchanged will be so large that wages will have to be lower than minimum wages. 
Notice that the schemes of compensation for time of service such like the ones in 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela conform to the neutral exchange mentioned 
above. Since in every period a share of current wages is deposited in an individual 
account, and this amount is made available to the worker in the future regardless of the 
cause of break up, these systems are not likely to increase labor costs or affect 
employment levels. They are just a way to redistribute labor income in ways that provide 
sustenance to the worker when his regular income is over. By contrast, compensations for 
dismissal are not likely to function as the neutral mechanism described above. This is 
partly because workers take severance payments as an entitlement, and therefore are not 
willing to exchange them for lower wages, and partly, because the formula to compute 
the compensation does not establish a clear link between current wages and future 
income
8.   
 
In third place, high dismissal costs do not necessarily lead to lower employment levels 
even when mandated severance payments cannot be fully factored in lower wages. Its 
effects depend, among other things, on the market structure in which firms operate, how 
fast firms discount the future, and how persistent are micro and macro shocks perceived 
to be. To better understand the source of this indeterminacy it is useful to consider first 
the case of a firm that is deciding how many workers to hire. When demand for its 
product is high and the firm may consider hiring more workers, high dismissal costs act 
as a hiring deterrent. After all, demand might turn out to be low in the future and the firm 
will have to pay a high cost to dismiss redundant workers.  By contrast, when demand is 
low and the firm may consider dismissing some workers, high dismissal costs act as a 
firing deterrent. Since firing workers is expensive, the firm will only dismiss a worker if 
the expected gains of having him or her employed at the firm are lower than the expected 
cost of adjusting the work force. Therefore, high dismissal costs lead to lower hiring and 
firing rates. In addition, the firm’s profits are reduced because its set of optimal hiring 
and firing decisions is restricted by the legislation. However, whether long-run 
employment is larger or smaller than it would be in an environment without dismissal 
costs depends on weather the firing or the hiring effect dominates
9 
10.  The overall effect 
on long-run employment is more likely to be negative if lower profits deter firms from 
entering into the market
11.  
 
Summarizing, the overall effects of employment protection on long-run employment 
cannot be clearly assessed from the theoretical standpoint.  The answer to whether labor 
legislation reduces long-run employment or increases informal work in the region is 
                                                           
8 In all Latin American countries, but Brazil, compensations for dismissal are computed as X number of 
wages per year of work at the firm. To do this computation, the last wage earned at the firm is used. This 
break the link between wages during the life of the contract and final severance payments.  
9 See Bertola (1990) for a full discussion and formalization of this argument.  
10 If the discount rate is very large, hiring rates might be larger than firing rates and long-run employment 
might increase with the dismissal costs.  
11 Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) calibrate a general equilibrium model to the US economy and find a 
large negative impact of job protection on long-run employment.  Most of this negative effect is due to the 
fact that lower profits deter firms’ entrance into the market.   11 
ultimately an empirical one.  In the next two sections we examine the existing evidence 
for OECD countries and provide some new evidence for the LAC region.  
 
  
2.2.2-  Employment protection, Employment and Self-employment  
 
In recent years, a substantial body of literature has examined the effects of employment 
protection provisions on employment and unemployment rates in the context of OECD 
countries. The evidence however is not conclusive. Bertola (1990) presents some simple 
correlations between an index of employment protection  and labor market outcomes.  
His results suggest that countries with high dismissal costs tend to experience less 
variability of employment. However, he finds no clear relationship between his index of 
employment protection and unemployment rates. Lazear (1990) repeats this exercise 
using a panel of employment and unemployment data from OECD countries. He finds 
that a reduction in severance payments lead to an increase in employment to population 
rates and a reduction in unemployment rates. His estimates however rely mostly on the 
cross-section differences across countries. Once he corrects for possible differences 
across countries his employment estimates become non-significant, albeit his 
unemployment estimates remain negative. Grubb and Wells (1993) construct an index of 
dependent work regulation for the OECD.Their findings are the following: (1) Total 
employment to population rates do not seem to be affected by dependent employment 
regulation, however its composition it is. Thus, a reduction in dismissal costs leads to an 
increase in dependent employment and a reduction in self-employment.  
 
Finally, Nickell (1997) also examines the correlation between labor market outcomes and 
a set of labor regulations and institutions. His findings suggest that employment 
protection provisions tend to reduce short run unemployment but increase long run rates.  
In addition, job security provisions tend to reduce overall employment but to increase 25-
54 male employment rates. Finally, job protection measures are associated with lower 
participation rates.  
 
Summarizing, results from OECD countries yield some evidence, albeit weak, that job 
security provisions might reduce employment rates. In addition, job security provisions 
might be also affecting the composition of employment increasing self-employment and 
prime-age employment at the expense of reducing dependent and youth employment 
rates. 
 
To our knowledge there is no evidence on the impact of employment protection on 
developing countries. In this section we provide some new evidence for an expanded 
sample of OECD, Latin American and Caribbean Countries.  
 
One possible way to measure the impact of job protection is to examine whether the 
institutional index described in section 2.2.1 is correlated with labor market indicators, 
such like total employment and self-employment. Unemployment rates are not a good 
performance indicator because they are likely to reflect the existence and generosity of 
unemployment insurance. Since institutional data on unemployment insurance, like 12 
replacement ratios or duration of benefits, has not been incorporated into the index, 
inferences from the unemployment rates are inappropriate and will not be pursued in the 
cross-section analysis. Tables 2 and 3 in the appendix summarize the results of regressing 
various categories of employment to population rates on the protection index and other 
control variables. Labor indicators are averages from the 1985-1996 period. Data covers 
both Latin America and OECD countries.  
 
The results for employment rates suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
employment protection and employment rates across the overall sample. However, one 
note of caution should be placed here.  Since in our sample there is a negative correlation 
between employment protection and GDP per capita and poorer countries tend to have 
lower total employment to population rates, the negative sign on the job protection index 
might be capturing a lower relative level of development.   
 
As a contrast, the results for self-employment rates suggest that there is a positive and 
highly significant correlation between employment protection and self-employment, even 
when GDP per capita is added as a control. This results are robust to the fact that poorer -




Summarizing, there is some evidence, albeit weak, that employment levels are negatively 
affected by job protection rates. In addition, these results yield a stronger positive 
relationship between job protection rates and self-employment suggesting that in highly 
protected labor markets, more workers turn to self-employment. Whether this is by 
choice —self-employment might be more attractive when dependent work is highly 
regulated—, or by necessity —workers turn to self-employment because their entrance 
into the wage employment is limited— cannot be inferred from this analysis.  
 
The former results make use of the cross-country variance in the OECD and LAC 
sample. One alternative source of variability can be found in different legislation 
episodes within one country. Unfortunately, only a few countries have experienced 
sufficient reforms in their labor codes as to generate enough time series variability. One 
of these few countries is Chile.  
 
2.2.3- Employment Protection and Composition of Employment by Age and Gender Groups 
 
Chile has experienced at least six different changes in labor legislation since 1960. This 
wide variability combined with the abundance of reliable data from household surveys 
make Chile an ideal candidate to study the impact of labor legislation on labor market 
outcomes. 
 
                                                           
12 Other regressions were run to examine the relationship between the protection index and formal and 
informal employment. See Márquez(1997) for a complete description of empirical results. 
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An additional reason to study Chile is that its labor codes, despite wide changes in the 
level of benefits, are similar to the rest of Latin American labor codes. This similarity 
suggests that results for Chile can be indicative of the impact of labor codes in other 
countries. Thus, for example, Chilean labor legislation has always relied on some form of 
compensation for dismissal to protect job stability. As in many other countries, their 
compensation is computed as one month’s pay per year of work. Yet, across legislation 
episodes different upper limits have been imposed, restricting the maximum perception to 
larger or smaller amounts. During the period ranging from 1981 to 1989, for example, the 
maximum compensation amount was five months, whereas since 1990, this amount has 
been increased to eleven months. Another component of the labor codes that has changed 
widely over time, are the reasons for just dismissal. While during the period 1966-1975 
was virtually impossible to dismiss a worker for economic reasons, from 1978 to 1984  
firms’ difficulties were considered just cause, freeing the firm from paying 
compensations in case of dismissal.   
.  
In this section we explode the variability in the Chilean labor codes to assess the impact 
of job protection on total employment, dependent employment, self-employment, 
unemployment and participation by age groups and gender
13. To do so, an index of job 
protection is computed for the period 1960-1996, combining information on notice 
periods, compensations for dismissal and the likelihood that economic difficulties were 
considered a just cause for dismissal. This index attempts to measure the expected cost, at 
the time the worker is hired, of dismissing a worker in the future. Various factors 
determine the expected dismissal cost: (1) Worker’s tenure at the firm matters since the 
longer a worker is kept at a job, the higher will be the dismissal costs in the event of a 
firm initiated separation. However, since real interest rates have been in average positive, 
costs that arise far in the future are relatively less important – since they are discounted—
than costs that may arise soon after a worker is hired. (2) The probability that a dismissal 
originated by firm’s difficulties is considered just or unjust matters, because it influences 
the compensation that the firm has to pay to the worker. When a firm hires a worker, the 
firm evaluates the dismissal cost and the probability that courts will rule in the future in 
its favor, based on information about current policy and current practices. Graph 2 plots 
the resulting index across the period for which we have household survey data. Higher 
values of the index indicate higher expected dismissal costs, whereas lower values of the 
index characterize periods in which dismissals were less expensive.  
                                                           
13 See Montenegro & Pages for a full description of the methodology and the results presented in this 
section. Data used correspond to longitudinal series obtained from yearly household surveys. The series 
cover the period between 1960 to 1996 and therefore range over both periods of intense macroeconomic 





Our results suggest that the effects of employment protection are felt differently by 
workers in different age groups. In particular, regressing participation, total employment, 
self-employment, dependent employment and unemployment on the index and other 
controls yield very different results for young workers than for more mature, pre-
retirement age workers
14 (See Tables 4-8 in the appendix). Results from the 15 to 25 
years old group set of regressions (Table 5) suggest that dismissal costs have a significant 
negative effect on young workers employment rates. Thus, an increase in the protection 
index equivalent to a one months’ pay, leads to a 1% point fall in young employment 
rates. This is a large effect equivalent to a loss of 11,160 jobs per year. Results for 
dependent and self-employment confirm that the reduction in employment is mostly due 
to a reduction in dependent employment rates. Young self-employment rates do not vary 
significantly with changes in labor codes, indicating that young workers do not turn into 
self-employment when finding a wage employment is less likely. Indeed, lower 
employment rates seem to be compensated by lower participation and higher 
unemployment rates for this age group.   
 
By contrast, results for the 51 to 65 years old suggest that a liberalization of firing 
restrictions is associated with a decrease in participation and employment of pre-
retirement age workers. The estimates indicate that an increase in the index equivalent to 
one month’s pay  leads to a 3% fall in employment rates, 1% fall in participation rates 
and 4 % points increase in unemployment rates for the pre-retirement age group. Unlike 
the case of young workers, this is mostly a once and for all effect that happens at the time 
of liberalization
15.  
                                                           
14 All dependent variables are expressed in growth rates. The set of control variables includes, depending 
on the cases: the one period lagged endogenous variable, the growth of GDP, and the change in the index. 
In addition we include a cross term constructed as the product of GDP growth and the level of the index, to 
capture the fact that higher dismissal costs might reduce the variability of employment in the business 
cycle. Finally, we also add the level of the index, to make sure the cross term is well defined. 
 
15 It should be mentioned that the presence of a lagged endogenous variable indicates that some of the 
effects will be spilled over future periods at a diminishing rate.  The main difference between young and 
pre-retirement workers results is that whereas for young workers what matter is the level of the index, for 
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The legislation index does not seem to have a significant effect on employment rates, 
neither for prime age workers nor for the whole 15-65 years old population, suggesting 
that reduced hiring and firing rates are approximately netted out for these larger 
population groups. Combining estimates for the different age groups suggest that a 
reduction in dismissal costs would reduce employment rates in the short run, and increase 
them over the long-run. This effect can be better understood with a numerical example 
based on the parameters for the different age groups. According to these estimates, a 
reduction in expected dismissal costs equivalent to one month pay, would immediately 
reduce employment rates for older workers, resulting in the destruction of 20,330 jobs. 
Yet, the reform would stimulate new hires. Net job creation among young workers will 
be positive with 11160 new jobs created every year. Net job creation among middle age 
workers would be approximately zero, because new hires would be outweighed by 
increased layoffs. Overall, the reforms would bring an immediate net loss of 9170 jobs.  
However, in the following years, net job creation would be positive, leading to higher 
employment to population rates over the long run.  
 
Female workers might also suffer the consequences of slow job creation. Because female 
participation rates are still low in Chile a high percentage of potential workers are still out 
of the labor market. Their entrance, however, might be hindered by low hiring rates. To 
test whether labor market reforms that reduce the expected dismissal costs are associated 
to increases in female employment rates, the same set of regressions mentioned above 
were run for women aged 15-65. The results exhibit a negative sign on the index, 
suggesting that high dismissal costs might hinder women’ s entrance in the labor market.  
The parameters however are not significant at conventional levels.   
 
As shown in section 2.2.2 job protection seems to have a positive, albeit not significant, 
effect on self-employment. This effect is smaller for younger workers, who most likely 
do not have the skills or the capital to become self-employed, even when opportunities in 
the wage employment sector are scarce.  
 
Finally, it was also examined whether higher dismissal costs are partially factored in 
lower wages. The evidence suggests that episodes of labor reform that increased 
dismissal costs were associated with wage reductions that compensated, at least partially, 
the increase in dismissal costs. 
 
In conclusion, the cross-section and time-series analysis presented above suggest that in 
Chile, a reduction in dismissal costs might reduce employment in the short run but lead to 
an increase in participation and employment rates over the long run. They also suggest 
that certain groups of workers (like young workers or women) might benefit from a 
reduction in job protection whereas other groups (pre-retirement age workers) might 
block any attempts of reform. This differential impact of a labor reform helps to explain 
why, so far, it has been so difficult to modify the current form of the labor codes.  
 
2.3 - Employment Protection and Employment Stability 
 16 
Latin American Labor codes were explicitly designed to encourage job stability.  By 
imposing large dismissal costs, two objectives could be achieved at once: On the one 
hand, imposing penalties on dismissals would minimize employers’ ability to arbitrarily 
fire workers in instances, in which the worker was not at fault. On the other hand, 
substantial turnover costs would insure workers against the risk of unemployment.  Yet, 
has this objective been accomplished? Is job stability higher in Latin America than in 
other countries that enjoy relatively lower levels of job protection? In this section we 
examine this issue by comparing employment duration across countries in and outside the 
LAC region. Our findings suggest that, albeit the typical Latin American worker 
experiences shorter job duration than the average US worker, once we control for 
differences in education and typical size of a firm, a Latin American worker remains 
longer in the job than her US counterpart.  
 
Despite the importance that labor codes assign to job stability, there are very few studies 
that attempt to measure employment duration in the region. As in other instances, the 
analysis of employment duration has been hindered by the lack of reliable data. 
Surprisingly, only a few household surveys include questions related to job duration. In 
addition, these questions are not regularly included, further limiting comparability across 
time and countries.  
 
Using data on uncompleted employment spells various authors have concluded that 
employment duration in Latin America might be shorter than in the US
16. Data on 
incomplete employment spells for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela 
and the US reveals that the typical worker in Latin America experiences higher turnover 
than the average US worker. The following table summarizes the % of 15-65 workers 
that report employment spells in the brackets, zero to two, more than two to five, and 
more than five years in the current job.  
 
 
% of workers in each tenure bracket 
Years of incomplete 
Tenure 
0-2  2.01 – 5  >5 
Argentina, 1995        32.55% 
Brazil,  1995  44.1%  18.4%  37.5% 
Chile,  1987  48.8% 13.8% 37.5% 
Colombia,  1994  44% 18% 38% 
Peru,  1985  28.8% 11.7% 59.5% 
Venezuela, 1995  54.3% 13.3% 32.5% 
US,  1987  36% 19% 44% 
Source:  Data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela comes from National Household Surveys. Data for 
Colombia and US has been obtained from Schaffner (1996). This data summarizes incomplete unemployment spells for 
all employed workers.  
 
 The percentage of workers that report current tenures of more than five years are much 
lower in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, than in the US. Within the 
                                                           
16 See Gonzaga (1997) and Schaffner (1996) for an analysis of employment duration in Brazil and 
Colombia.  
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region, Venezuela and Argentina are the countries in which workers report lower 
employment duration. By contrast, Peru experiences low relative levels of turnover, even 
when compared to the US. It could be stated that this is the result of reporting data 
relative to 1985, when dismissing a worker was virtually impossible. However, 
preliminary results by Saavaedra (1998) do not confirm this argument. Indeed, his 
findings suggest that there have not been significant changes in job duration since 1985, 
even when dismissal costs were drastically reduced after 1991. 
 
Since in the US the law does not mandate severance payments in case of a firm-initiated 
dismissal, the former results might be interpreted as an indication that employment 
protection provisions have not been able to increase job stability in Latin America. Yet, 
this has not been the case.  
 
To properly compare turnover rates across countries various factors should be taken into 
account: First, if tenure for young workers is shorter than for their older counterparts, 
countries with younger labor forces will exhibit lower average employment spells. 
Second, countries that experience faster employment or participation growth will also 
exhibit lower average duration because many workers are at the beginning of their 
employment spells. Third, if more skilled workers tend to have longer tenures, then 
countries with a higher proportion of skilled workers will exhibit lower average tenures. 
Fourth, if smaller are more unstable and therefore less likely to provide long employment 
spells, countries with a larger proportion of small firms will exhibit lower average 
employment duration. Graph 3 displays employment duration by age (3.a), education 
(3.b) and size of the firm (3.c) for male workers. Age groups are included to control for 
differences in labor force structure across countries. In addition, we only focus on male 
workers because differences in the rate at which female enter the labor force might affect 









*Argentina and Bolivia are urban only.


























Graph3b:Job Tenure and Education. Difference between workers that have secondary education completed and 



































































































Graph3c: Job Tenure and Firm Size.
































It is rather clear that the duration of employment increases with the age of a worker. 
Regarding the impact of skills, the duration of employment increases with education in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, United States and Venezuela, whereas decreases with 
education in Bolivia and Peru. In the first group of countries, it is likely that workers with 
higher levels of formal education are more able to acquire specific skills, and therefore 
become harder for the firm to replace. In the event of a demand slowdown, firms prefer to 
keep their highly qualified workers and dismiss the less skilled ones. It is unclear why 
this is not the case in the second group of countries. 
 
Finally, graph 3 exhibits that the size of the firm is a very important factor in determining 
the duration of employment. In all countries, but Brazil, workers employed at large firms 
tend to experience longer employment spells. Notice that in the United States tenure also 
increases with the size of the firm, suggesting important differences in the nature and 
behavior of small firms versus large ones. In particular, workers employed at small firms 
might have larger turnover rates because (1) small firms tend to attract younger and 
perhaps, less skilled workers, (2) small firms tend to be younger, (3) small firms are more 
exposed to macroeconomic shocks. (See Tables 9, 10 and 11 in the appendix for more 
detailed information on tenures by age, education and size of the firm) 
 
Given these large differences in job duration by age, skills and size of the firm, the only 
manner to properly compare job duration across countries is to control for all these 
differences.  Graph 3.d summarizes the results of comparing  job duration, among the 




The results indicate that (1) Latin American workers exhibit lower average tenures than 
US workers because they are more likely to be low skilled and employed at a small firm, 
and (2) with the exception of Brazil, once we compare similarly skilled workers 
                                                           
17 Information on tenure controlling for age, education and firm size was not available for Colombia and the 
US.  To relate tenures in Latin America to tenures in the US , we compare the % of  Latin American skilled 
workers with 10 or more years employed at a large firm with  the % of  US  workers employed at a large 
firm.  For Bolivia and Peru the comparison with the US is based on % of Bolivian and Peruvian unskilled 
workers with 10 or more years at a large firm respect to % of US workers with 10 or more years at a large 
firm.  















employed at similar size firms, we find that Latin American workers remain longer at 
their jobs than their US counterparts. 
 
Finally, are these lower turnover rates a product of employment protection provisions? 
Our evidence suggests so. First, if workers have a larger probability of being formal in 
large firms, then the differences in employment duration between large and small firms 
suggest that longer employment duration in large firms might be partly due to 
employment protection. Second, workers that are covered by legally mandated benefits, 
like social security, tend to experience longer tenures than workers who do not (See 
Graph 4). Third, despite that macroeconomic volatility is much larger in Latin America 
than in the US, (See IADB, 1995) similarly educated workers in similarly large firm have 
longer employment spells in Latin America than in the US.  
 21 
Graph 4: Mean Tenure for workers covered by SS and workers that are not22 
 
That large output volatility does not lead to large employment volatility, suggest that 
employment protection provisions have prevented large employment adjustments when shocks 
arise.  Yet firms might pay a high price for not adjusting, reducing their profits, their 
probabilities of survival and their incentives to participate in business activities. Alternatively, 
workers might pay a price for stability in the form of lower employment and more volatile 
wages. In economic contractions firms might resort to hoard labor and pay lower wages per 
employee. In expansions, they might hire few workers and demand more effort from their 
existing labor force. In fact, evidence from OECD countries, as well as for Chile, suggests that 
higher dismissal costs lead to more pro-cyclical real wages
18. Yet, if wages are more difficult to 
adjust in low inflation periods, inflation stabilization might increase the share of dismissal costs 
borne by firms.  
 
Summarizing, employment security provisions have successfully increased employment spells 
and reduced employment turnover for some workers. However, is job stability the right 
objective to pursue? We postpone the discussion of this question until the final section of this 
paper. We now investigate who is more likely to be protected by labor codes.  
 
2. 4. Social Security Contributions and Equity 
 
In the former section we have reported important inequities in job stability across workers. In 
this section we complete this analysis by examining whether the benefits mandated by law are 
evenly spread across individuals or instead, some workers are more likely to enjoy these 
benefits than others.  In performing this analysis we go beyond the classical formal-informal 
sector division based on the size of the firm and find, that a substantial percentage of workers in 
larger firms do not enjoy the benefits associated with being “formal”. In addition, our results 
suggest that there are important inequities in the coverage of these benefits. These differences 
might reveal that (1) the cost of formalizing a worker differs across workers or (2) some 
workers value  “formality” less than others.  
 
To measure the extent and distribution of coverage, we need a measure of what it is to be 
subjected to the legislation. Whereas in some countries is clear who belongs to the protected 
sector and who does not, in others countries this distinction is less clear-cut. Unfortunately, very 
few Household Surveys in the region include questions on whether workers have access to the 
benefits specified by the labor codes. Instead most surveys and studies rely on the size of the 
firm to assess the degree of formality or informality of a worker. Our analysis indicates that firm 
size is not a good indicator of legislation coverage, since a substantial number of workers 
employed in large firms are not covered by dependent employment regulations. In addition, the 
appearance of new contractual forms, such like part-time or fixed-workers, introduces further 
divergences between size of the firm and benefits received by employees. In this section, we use 
available information on whether a worker has access to social security through his or her 
employer to classify him or her as covered or uncovered.  
                                                           
18 See Bertola (1990)  and Montenegro & Pages (1998) for an analysis of wage behavior in the OECD countries 
and Chile. 23 
























  24.84% 54.88% 76.68% 67.02% 85.52% 78.21%
 
Gender 
  male 33.64% 52.30% 59.7% 78.8% 69.11% 83.43% 80.41%
  female 14.32% 62.22% 53.6% 72.1% 65.21% 89.26% 77.26%
 
Education 
  0  2.64% 17.43% 30.5% 66.4% 33.27% 73.58% 52.40%
  1-8  14.67% 43.38% 50.7% 67.8% 56.67% 80.60% 70.02%
  9-12 35.04% 68.97% 75.4% 80.2% 69.16% 90.78% 81.72%
  12+ 57.99% 81.20% 87.8% 91.4% 73.31% 96.23% 90.92%
 
Activity 
  1  2.68% 4.48% 15.2% 63.4% 66.54% 76.13% 66.06%
  2  89.16% 68.70% 70.3% 95.4% 88.75% 92.91%
  3  42.07% 70.73% 77.8% 83.7% 70.03% 92.40% 85.08%
  4  91.37% 84.95% ERR 92.6% 80.23% 99.31% 87.67%
  5  32.29% 40.05% 49.8% 84.2% 42.96% 62.86% 83.06%
  6  24.40% 45.13% 61.9% 79.6% 62.42% 86.67% 82.5%
  7  53.14% 42.90% 78.7% 81.8% 64.64% 87.45% 85.26%
  8  65.75% 77.05% 88.5% 78.9% 77.72% 93.19% 93.53%
  9  54.41% 67.68% 81.2% 76.5% 69.87% 88.88% 93.53%
 
Age 
  15-25 8.61% 38.90% 39.6% 60.5% 53.52% 79.76% 69.68%
  26-55 35.35% 63.02% 66.1% 82.2% 73.75% 88.25% 82.77%
  56-65 28.09% 63.51% 58.8% 79.7% 69.65% 89.12% 78.37%
 
Sector 
  urban 37.34% 60.78% 63.8% 80.6% n.a. 89.37% 81.02%




  head 45.47% 63.61% 69.6% 84.8% 76.27% 89.59% 84.25%
  spouse 11.89% 64.84% 46.5% 76.2% 63.42% 92.68% 75.91%
  son, daughter 16.39% 47.78% 50.5% 66.0% 59.35% 78.73% 74.69%
  parents 9.94% 65.14% 68.0% 84.16% 23.81%
  son, daughter in 
law 
28.27% 55.13% 81.1% 83.45% 73.20%
  grandchildren 8.20% 49.37% 56.4% 84.03% 66.17%
  domestic 
workers 
0.0% 0.42% 28.8% 63.29% 65.39% 83.97%

























  <5 15.56% 8.82% <=5 36.52 <=5  35.40 <5 66.41 <5 62.04
  5-20 37.66% 38.11% 6-10 62.17 6-25  69.05 5<=20 84.38 5-49 81.07
  20-100 67.62% 60.71% 11- 87.52 26-100 89.80 20- 96.43 50-199 85.34
  100- 81.99% 84.89% 101- 93.31 200- 95.83
Multiples 
Of  0.91-1.2 44.49% 50.07% 77.99% 58.19%
Minimum  1.21-2 72.93% 62.48% 62.39% 90.06% 76.77%
Wage  2-3 79.55% 74.33% 73.71% 94.30% 84.01%
  3+ 73.85% 83.82% 79.66% 95.13% 94.16%
Ocupation* 
  1 74.83% 80.29% 83.81% 86.83% 96.17% 94.12%
  2 79.05% 80.84% 81.98% 66.84% 97.87% 87.37%
  3 71.75% 80.84% 86.91% 85.91% 96.63% 89.36%
  4 14.08% 36.64% 53.44% 54.77% 85.36% 70.40%
  5 28.21% 53.24% 45.91% 82.98% 83.01%
  6 2.37% 4.79% 15.45% 72.26% 57.86%
  7  41.25% 50.26% 67.98% 62.39%         83.32%              75.93%
 
Notes 
*Argentina 1996- People who have some kinds of benefits (e.x. combination with indemnification or combination 
without indemnification etc.) are considered as having social security. 
*Venezuela 1995-Both the labor income and the minimum wage include bonus. 
*Regarding the firm size, each country has its own category. 
*Perú 1996- A question about social security is asked only for the people who went to the hospital in the last 15 
days.  This group of people is too small to analyze. 
*Ocupation 
 
Table 12 reports the percentage of dependent workers in each socio-economic group that are 
covered by employment regulation. All percentages are measured with respect to the total 
number of dependent workers in each sub-group.  This table exhibits that there are important 
differences in coverage across countries. Costa Rica and Chile are the countries in our sample 
that exhibit a larger percentage of covered workers. Argentina and Venezuela stand at 
intermediate levels, whereas Peru registers an extremely low degree of coverage in the 
dependent workers sample.  
 
There are important differences in coverage associated to the individual characteristics of 
workers. In particular, age and education are two important factors determining the probability 
of being covered by dependent employment regulation. Regarding age; prime age workers tend 
to have the largest coverage ratios, whereas young workers stand at the lower end. In reference 
to education, our tabulated results exhibit a large and positive correlation between education 
levels and social security coverage. In Venezuela, for example, only 17.5 % of dependent 
workers without an education, have access to the system, whereas more than 81% of dependent 25 
workers with 12 or more years of education have access to social benefits. Finally, gender 
seems to somewhat affect the probability of obtaining social security, albeit gender differences 
are not consistent across countries. Whereas male dependent workers are more likely to have 
social security benefits in Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina, female workers have a higher 
probability of being covered in Costa Rica and Venezuela.  
 
 
Another important determinant of coverage is whether workers leave in rural or urban  areas. 
Urban workers have a larger probability of being covered than rural ones. In Brazil and 
Venezuela these differences are very large, whereas in Costa Rica and Chile, these differences 
are less important.  
 
Coverage rates also depend on the status that workers have in their families.  Household heads 
are much more likely to enjoy social security benefits compared to spouses, and other relatives 
in the family.  
 
Regarding job related variables, coverage rates tend to be larger in those sectors of activity in 
which the public sector is more important, while they tend to be lower in agriculture, 
construction and retail.  In the same manner, coverage rates tend to be higher among 
professional workers, managers and administrative staff and lower among salesmen, service, 
agriculture, and blue collar workers.  Finally, the probability of being covered by social security 
increases with the wage that a worker makes and the size of the firm in which he or she is 
employed. 
 
The percentages shown in Table 12 do not control for correlations among variables that can be 
important in explaining who gets social security. For instance, low skilled workers are more 
likely to be employed in small firms, which in turn, are less likely to comply with social security 
regulations. Low skilled workers are then, less likely to have social security because their lack 
of skills or because the type of job they have?. In order to properly assess this question, we run 




The results (see table 13 in the appendix) are very similar to the raw probabilities reported in 
Table 12. In particular, in both countries the probability of having social security increases with 
education, level of income, age, and urbanity. The probability of being covered also depends on 
the sector of activity: Agriculture, construction, transports and communications are the sectors 
in which, other things constant, workers are less likely to have social security. In addition, blue-
collar workers are less likely to be covered than white-collar workers.  Finally, being female 
reduces the probability of obtaining social security in Argentina, but no so in Venezuela. 
 
These results are disturbing. As it turns out, less advantaged workers are less likely to be enjoy 
the benefits mandated by law. Notice that these results hold true even when we control for the 
size of the firm. This means, that less skilled workers employed at large firms are also less 
likely to be protected by labor codes. It remains unclear whether this pattern results from a 
                                                           
19. The variables included in the regressions are: Level of education, Income level, age group, gender, sector of 
activity, size of the firm and occupation 26 
relatively lower preference for protection by part of lower income workers, or instead, to a 
higher relative cost for the firm to insure these workers. Indeed, the empirical evidence on 
relative labor demand elasticities suggest that labor demand for unskilled workers is more 
elastic than for skilled ones. In absence of other differences in their relative labor supply or their 
relative taste for protection, lower skilled workers should be bearing a higher share of the tax 
incidence than high skilled workers do. This in turn, suggests that firms should be more, not 
less, willing to nominally pay social security for low skilled workers since these payments can 
be easily transferred to workers.  
 
If this theory is correct, then the relatively lower incidence of  “formality” among less 
advantaged workers could be explained by: 
 
(1) Given current tax rates, these workers choose to remain informal. In this scenario, workers 
lose benefits but gain in exchange a higher wage. For poorer workers, this extra income 
may very well help them to bridge some cash or credit constraints. This argument is similar 
to the ones put forth to explain the low incidence of savings among less advantaged 
workers.  
(2)  “Formalize” less-skilled, lower income workers, is more expensive for the firm. Thus, 
when a worker is awarded a “formality” status, he is entitled to both social security benefits 
and severance payments in the case of firm-initiated dismissal. Yet, firms might find that is 
relatively more expansive to provide job stability to less skilled workers. To understand 
why, let us consider the case of a firm that produces with low and high skilled workers and 
faces a demand contraction.  In absence of mandated severance payments, the firm will 
dismiss unskilled workers first, since they can be easily replaced in the future, and their 
dismissal would not bring a loss of specific skills. Thus, in the presence of mandated 
severance payments, the expected cost of hiring a low skilled worker ‘by the rules” is 
higher than for more inherently stable high skilled workers.  
 
Summarizing, the very same people that labor codes seek to protect, are the ones that are less 
likely to enjoy the benefits of protection. Future research should be oriented to explain these 
relative differences albeit some explanations have been already laid out in this section. If lower 
skill workers prefer higher wages than in-kind benefits, social security as we know it might not 
do much to provide future pensions and health benefits to these workers. In addition, if 
providing job stability is more expensive for low skill workers, then dismissal costs might be 
only biasing the relative demand for these two groups towards high skills. It is then clear that 
increasing enforcement levels is not the solution to this dilemma.  
 
One alternative is to lower social security payments for the less advantaged workers as means to 
bring them into the system. Another is to increase the link between benefits and payments, such 




3- Minimum Wages 
 27 
Most countries in the region set the minimum wage that a worker must receive.  The existence 
and setting of minimum wages remains a very controversial issue. On the one hand, it has been 
claimed that minimum wages are a classical example of intervention, in which the policy 
increases the unemployment rates of the very people it seeks to protect.  On the other hand, it 
has been argued that minimum wages are redistribution tools whose effectiveness depends on 
whether the benefits of rising income for the poor, compensate the costs of increased 
unemployment rates.  
 
In most countries, real minimum wages are now lower than they were at the beginning of the 
80’s and they are less likely to be used actively and aggressively as a policy tool. In this section 
we examine whether minimum wages affect the wage distribution in ways that are conducive to 
increase unemployment rates. To do so, we use the wage information contained in household 
surveys for the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Peru and Venezuela. As in former sections, we only look at wages for dependent 
workers, since minimum wage regulations do not apply to the self-employed.  Besides 
analyzing wage distributions for total dependent workers, we study three additional sub-groups 
of this sample.  First, we divide the sample between male and female on the grounds that 
minimum wages might be more important for female workers. Second, we partition the total 
sample in age groups. Again, the motivation behind this partition is that the wage distribution of 
certain age groups, like younger workers, might be more affected by minimum wage setting. 
Finally, we partition the sample between urban and rural workers based on the presumption that 
minimum wages might be more relevant in the rural areas.  All wages are measured in 
wages/hour. In addition labor income hour for formal, blue-collar workers has been corrected to 
include over-time compensations.   
 
Graphs 5 to 13 plot wage distributions for the sample of total dependent workers, male/female 
dependent workers, dependent employment by age groups and rural/urban workers. These 
graphs exhibit large differences across countries in the way the minimum wage affects wage 
distributions. Two groups of countries can be distinguished: In the first groups, formed by 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, there is no evidence that minimum wages affect the wage 
distributions in ways that might lead to higher unemployment rates for workers in the minimum 
wage bracket. In these four countries the percentage of people that receive wages around the 
minimum wage is low (10% or less). In addition, there is no evidence of a spike at the minimum 
wages bracket either in the total wage distribution, or in the other three sub-distributions.   28 
*Labor income only from a primary job per hour is used.
*Gran Buenos Aires area only
*Labor income per hour is corrected for overtime work for formal, operational workers who work overtime. 
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used. 
*Total labor income includes both an income from a primary job and an income from a secondary job (92% of people used for calculation have only one job.)
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used. 
*Labor income per hour is corrected for overtime work for formal, operational workers who work overtime. 
(95% of people used for calculation have only one job.)
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used.
*Total labor income includes both an income from a primary job and an income from a secondary job (98% of people used for calculation have only one job.)
*Labor income per hour is corrected for overtime work for formal, operational workers who work overtime. 
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used. 
*Total labor income includes both an income from a primary job and an income from a secondary job.
(a percentage of people who have only one job is not available in this survey.)
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used. 
*Total labor income includes both an income from a primary job and an income from a secondary job.
(a percentage of people who have only one job is not available in this survey.)
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used. 
*Total labor income includes both an income from a primary job and an income from a secondary job.( 83% of people used for calculation have only one job.)
*Labor income per hour is corrected for overtime work for formal, operational workers who work overtime. 
*Hourly minimum wage=(monthly minimum wage)/48*4.3 assuming 48 hours is the standard working hours per week.
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*Total labor income divided by total working hours is used. The labor income includes bonus. 
*Total labor income includes both an income from a primary job and an income from a secondary job (98% of people used for calculation have only one job.)
*Labor income per hour is corrected for overtime work for formal, operational workers who work overtime. 
*Hourly minimum wage=(monthly minimum wage including bonus)/44*4.3.
Graph 13
Venezuela 1995
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Instead, in a second group of countries formed by Brazil Colombia, Costa Rica, and 
Venezuela, minimum wages are binding the wage distribution. In all these countries the 
percentage of people that fall in the minimum wage bracket is high (15 % in Brazil, 22% 
in Costa Rica, 25% in Colombia and 24% in Venezuela). In addition, in all these four 
countries there exists a large spike at the minimum wage bracket, indicating a bunching 
of workers at the minimum wage.  When splitting the sample between male and female 
dependent workers we find that minimum wages tend to be slightly more binding for 
female workers in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, whereas in Costa Rica, minimum 
wages seem to be more binding for men.  In this group of countries, the % of workers 
below the minimum wage is lower for female workers than for men, suggesting higher 
levels of non-compliance for female workers.   
 
When splitting the sample across age groups, we find that minimum wages tend to more 
binding for young workers than for workers in other age groups.  This difference is 
especially large in Colombia and Costa Rica, where around 30% of the workers in the 15-
25 age group receive wages in the minimum wage bracket.  
 
Finally, when looking at the differences between urban and rural areas we find that non-
compliance is much larger in rural areas suggesting a lower enforcement capability. 
Despite low levels of enforcement, in both Brazil and Costa Rica minimum wages seem 
to be more binding in the rural areas. As a contrast, in Venezuela minimum wages are 
more binding in the urban areas.  
 
Our results suggest that minimum wages are significantly affecting wage distributions in 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela.  Yet, are minimum wages affecting 
unemployment rates in any way? We have seen that minimum wages are specially 
binding for some groups of workers. Using this information, we examine whether 
unemployment rates for these groups are high with respect to total unemployment rates
20.  
Graph 14 plots relative female to total and, young workers to total unemployment rates.  
Unemployment rates for young workers are specially high in Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Colombia and Venezuela, and lower in Bolivia, Chile and Peru suggesting that minimum 
wages might be causing high unemployment rates among these groups.  Graph 14 also 
reveals some correlation between binding minimum wages and higher female 
unemployment rates. In particular, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela experience 
relatively high female unemployment rates.  Yet, this evidence is weakened by the fact 
that Argentina and Chile experience respectively high youth and female unemployment 
despite that minimum wages do not significantly alter their wage distributions.  
     
Summarizing, our results suggest that minimum wages are altering wage distributions in 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela.  In addition, we cannot reject a causality 
link between minimum wages and higher unemployment rates for women and young 
workers.  
                                                           
20 The use of relative instead of absolute unemployment rates allows us to control, at least partially, for 
other cyclical and structural effects that might be affecting absolute unemployment rates. 38 
Graph 1439 
 
4  - Collective bargaining and union activities in Latin America.  
 
This section will deal with the problems raised by the contrast between the changes in the 
economic and political environment in the region and the relative lack of change in the 
structure of the industrial relation systems. We purport that the crux of the problem lies in 
the need to re-orient State intervention in the labor market from a role of mandating 
benefits and protection, and towards a role of promoter and protector of union 
organization and bargaining activities. For unions the challenge is how to expand 
membership and organize workers in a much more fragmented labor market dominated 
by smaller and more competitive production units. 
 
Industrial relations systems are the nexus of countries social, political and economic 
environments.  Each of these arenas has changed dramatically as the region has 
reoriented itself from the state-led ISI model to market-led development, transferring 
responsibility for allocating resources, including labor, and stimulating production from 
the state to the market. Most countries in the region adopted stabilization policies and 
major economic restructuring, including varying degrees of commercial and financial 
liberalization. These reforms have affected labor relations by changing the way in which 
competitiveness is measured, increasing employers pressures to manage the workforce at 
less cost.  Opening markets has also changed the scale of production from large, 
vertically integrated oligopolies protected by tariffs, to smaller, nuclear production 
units.
21 Competitiveness strategies, once based on volume and prices, are now driven by 
comparative advantage and advances in technology and innovation. 
 
Governments have redefined their role as economic agents, privatizing state industries, 
downsizing government structures, and shedding government employment, thus giving 
the markets a more crucial role in generating employment and clearing labor supply and 
demand.   To facilitate this role some countries have adopted reforms to ease labor code 
regulations that are perceived as obstacles to employment generation
22. Meanwhile, the 
return from authoritarian to democratic regimes in many of the countries has brought 
with it expanded political freedoms, including the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining and strike. The growth of democracy in the face of structural reforms has 
increased the impetus for social consultation and tri-partite bargaining, as governments 
seek to maintain their presence in labor relations and encourage social cohesion and 
acceptance of reform. 
 
Just as government and businesses have redefined their modus operandi to complement 
market-led strategies, so must unions and the underlying industrial relations systems 
adapt to complement and motivate the new economic structures and production 
                                                           
21 For example, in Latin America the proportion of non-agricultural employment in the formal sector 
provided by large businesses fell from 44.1% in 1980 to 30.8% in 1992, and increased in small businesses 
from 14.6% to 22.5%. See Víctor E. Tokman, ΑInformalidad y Pobreza: Progreso Social y Modernización 
Productiva,≅  El Trimestre Economico, México, Vol. LXI, Núm. 241, Enero-Marzo 1994, p. 178. 
22 Including the promotion of temporary and fiscally-exempted labor contracts that exempt employers from 
social security contributions, severance payments, and other indirect labor costs mandated in the 
legislation.     40 
strategies. The traditional union strategy in Latin America has been to  improve workers 
welfare through legislative protections and macroeconomic policies to redistribute 
income, that can only be attained through strong links to the state and the political 
process. In the new economic and political environment unions face a triple challenge. 
First, in an environment where workers  welfare is seen as emanating from the producing 
unit in which they associate, they need to redefine their relationship with the government 
and the private sector.
23 Secondly, unions are facing a transition  from large to small 
firms,  the ascension of new key industries, the redesign of production strategies, and the 
decentralization of production (whether through the production process via outsourcing 
or maquila industries, or geographically though the development of outlying areas, the 
expansion of  MNCs, etc.).  And thirdly, unions must accommodate a changing labor 
market characterized by a growing informal economy, the feminization of the labor force, 
and high levels of unemployment (Zapata 1995, pp. 38-41). Therefore, the main 
challenge of unions has evolved from one of protecting their civil and political liberties, 




4.1  Industrial relation systems 
 
Industrial relation systems in the region are characterized by pervasive State intervention, 
weakening the incentives for workers to organize unions and actively bargain. Union 
density in the region is relatively low, and falling, and collective bargaining coverage 
rates are low. 
 
The industrial relations systems in Latin America are as diverse as the historical, political 
and economic conditions in each country.  Nonetheless, with the exception of Uruguay, 
the region systems can be characterized by one common trait: pervasive state 
intervention. State intervention has been used to both centralize collective bargaining 
systems, as in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as to decentralize them as in Peru 
and Chile. Several arguments have been advanced in the literature to explain the tendency 
for state intervention in collective labor relations in Latin America. They include: the 
atomization of unions and dependence on the State to provide legal protections; legalismo 
or the cultural acceptance that rights are only conferred by laws; and the historically 




The State presence in the system both protects and weakens the industrial relations 
system. An oft-cited justification for intervention is the predominantly weak collective 
bargaining structure in the region.  It is argued that intervention is and has been necessary 
                                                           
23 See John Pencavel, ΑLabor Unions in Latin America,≅  Conferencia Sobre Mercados de Trabajo en 
América Latina, by The World Bank, The Brookings Institution, and the InstitutoTorcuato Di Tella, in  
Buenos Aires, July 6-7, 1995, p.9. 
24 For further discussion, see Oscar Ermida Uriarte, “Orígen, Características y Perspectivas”, in Antonio 
Ojeda Avilés and Óscar Ermida Uriarte, eds., Parte III, La Intervención Administrativa, of  La Negociación 
Colectiva en América Latina, (Madrid, Spain: Instituto Europeo de Relaciones Industriales, 1993), pp. 107-
117. 41 
to ensure that unions are given credibility and that employers engage in collective 
bargaining. The down side of that strategy is that workers lose incentive to affiliate to 
unions and participate in collective bargaining when the protections and benefits are 
mandated.   
 
It is not surprising then that the region experienced a decrease in union affiliation 
measured as a percentage of the non-agricultural labor force (Graph 15). In all countries 
for which we have data for the two periods, with the only exception of Chile, union 
density (measured as a percentage of total non-agricultural labor force) fell in the nineties 
relative to the eighties. This is likely to be the result of changes in the composition of 
employment (reduction in the highly unionized public sector employment and increase in 
the share of the informal sector).  
 












Source: Industrial Relations: Democracy and Social Stability, World Labour Report 1997-1998, pp. 237, 246, 248. See 
Table 14.  
 
Union density as a percentage of non-agricultural labor force in the region varies 
substantially among countries, ranging from 32% in Brazil to 4.4% in Guatemala (Table 
14). The bigger countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) all have union 
densities around or above 25%, and most of the rest of the countries (with the exception 
of low-income Central American countries) have union density rates around 15%. These 
rates are below those predominant in the Nordic European countries characterized by 
centralized wage bargaining structures (above 50%), but well above that in the US 
(12.7%). Surprisingly, the range of union density rates in the region is similar to that of 42 
the East Asian ex-miracle countries (Taiwan 27.9%, Malaysia 11.7%, Korea 9%, and 
Singapore 13.5%), belying the attribution of low-union density as an explanation of their 
strong economic performance. 
 
Table 14: Different measures of union density in the region, 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Country 
As a % of non-agricultural 
labor force 
As a % of wage  and salary 
earners 
As a % of 
formal sector 
wage earners
  Ref. 
Date 
%  Ref. 
Date 
%  Ref. 
Date 
%  Ref. 
Date 
%  Ref. 
Date 
% 
Argentina  1986  48.7  1995  25.4  1986  67.4  1995  38.7  1995  65.6 
Bolivia      1994  16.4          1994  59.7 
Brazil      1991  32.1      1991  43.5  1991  66 
Chile  1985  11.6  1993  15.9           1993  33 
Colombia  1985  11.2  1995  7          1995  17 
Costa Rica  1985  22.9  1995  13.1  1985  29.1  1995  16.6  1995  27.3 
Dom. Rep.  1989  18.9  1995  17.3             
Ecuador      1995  9.8          1995  22.4 
El Salvador  1985  7.9  1995  7.2  1985  8.3      1995  10.7 
Guatemala  1985  8.1  1994  4.4  1985  8.2       1994  7.7 
Guyana      1995  25.2             
Honduras      1994  4.5          1994  20.8 
Mexico  1989  54.1  1991  31  1989  59.6  1991  42.8  1991  72.9 
Nicaragua      1995  23.4          1995  48.2 
Panama      1991  14.2      1991  20.1  1991  29 
Paraguay      1995  9.3          1995  50.1 
Peru      1991  7.5          1991  18.3 
Uruguay  1990  19.9  1993  11.6          1993  20.2 
Venezuela  1988  25.9  1995  14.9  1988  29.8  1995  17.1  1995  32.6 
Source: Industrial Relations: Democracy and Social Stability, World Labour Report 1997-1998, pp. 237, 
246, 248 
 
Enterprise unions and firm level bargaining predominate in the region, with the important 
exceptions (in terms of population and economic power) of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
and Uruguay whose systems are highly centralized. Coverage rates in the region 
(Table15) oscillate from more than 70% in Argentina (with a sector-centered bargaining 
structure) to slightly above 10% in Bolivia and Chile (the first with a highly centralized 
wage-setting system not based in collective bargaining, and the second with a very 
decentralized bargaining structure). Collective bargaining coverage rates in the region are 
quite lower than in Europe (between 80 and 90% of formal sector workers in most 
countries), but higher than those in East Asian countries (18.8% in Singapore, 3.4% in 
Taiwan, and 2.6% in Malaysia) in spite of similar levels of unionization.  
 43 
Table 15: Proportion of employees covered by a collective agreement. 
Country  Year  % covered 
    
Argentina 1995  72.9 
Bolivia 1995  11.1 
Chile 1995  12.7 
El Salvador  1995  13.2 
Guyana 1995  27.0 
Honduras 1995  12.7 
Nicaragua 1995  38.3 
Panama 1995  16.0 
Uruguay 1993  21.6 
Source: Industrial Relations: Democracy and Social Stability, ILO World Labour Report 1997-1998, pp. 237, 246, 248. 
Estimates from ILO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, except for Chile, Ministry of Labor. 
 
A study of six countries reveals the diversity of the collective bargaining systems in the 
region.  Of these, four countries are centralized: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico.  
Argentina and Brazil systems are corporatist, highly interventionist systems, while 
Uruguay is unique for its “unregulated” system originated with the repeal in 1985 of the 
restrictive union legislation enacted by the military government. Mexico is a special case 
because it is categorized as centralized even though firm-level unions predominate. The 
Mexican system is highly corporatist and concentrates bargaining through coordination, a 
disciplined union hierarchy, and strong-handed state intervention.  Chile and Peru have 
very decentralized systems.  While Chile system is highly regulated, it allows 
considerable autonomy in direct negotiations.  In contrast, the atomization of the union 
movement in Peru is exacerbated by high state intervention.  Table 16 summarizes the 
main characteristics of these collective bargaining regimes, focusing on the dimensions of 
centralization and state intervention. 
Trends and convergence 
Despite the variance in industrial relations systems across the region, some experts see a 
pattern of convergence in both the centralization/decentralization and 
autonomous/interventionist dimension of industrial relations regimes. For example, 
Argentina is now discussing reforms that would allow parties to move negotiations to the 
firm level. In contrast, Chile, a highly decentralized regime, reformed its system to allow 
multi-enterprise bargaining for the first time since 1973 (although the Constitution only 
protects firm-level bargaining).  This reform aimed at increasing the low coverage of 
collective agreements.
25  In El Salvador, the 1994 reform gave federations and 
confederations the right to exercise collective bargaining and right to strike.  
 
There is similar convergence along the lines of state intervention, though it is less 
apparent since all countries except Uruguay and to some extent Chile have interventionist 
systems.  There is currently support for minimal regulation of the Uruguay system.  In 
contrast, countries with acute intervention have adopted reforms promoting collective 
                                                           
25In 1993, 9.7% of employed workers and 15.5% of salaried employees were covered in a collective 
contract or agreement. 36.1% of workers in small businesses of at least 50 workers, and 1.3% of smaller 
businesses were covered by collective agreements. 44 
autonomy. In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution prohibits state intervention in union approval 
or administration. It also provides for private voluntary arbitration as an alternative to the 
dissidio process, and upheld collective bargaining as the only mechanism to worsen 
employment conditions
26. Peru also expanded its collective autonomy by encouraging 
private voluntary conciliation and making the conciliation process more flexible. In 
Colombia, the 1990 reform states that unions would be automatically registered if 
registration not explicitly denied within 15 days, and that they could only be dissolved by 
judicial decision.  It also established a list of anti-union activities subject to sanction.  The 
1994 reform in El Salvador and the 1992 reform in the Dominican Republic included 
reforms to reduce the control of the Labor Ministry over trade unions, and increased the 
promotion of collective union activities. 
 
                                                           
26 Despite these reforms, much of the intervention by the State has been replaced through judicial 
enforcement 45 
Table 16: The industrial relation settings in 6 Latin American countries 
  General Characteristics  State Intervention  Centralization/Decentralization 
Argentina  Centralized, high state intervention.  Recent efforts 
to decentralize. 
State confers Personería Gremial (PG) determining 
who bargains; all agreements must be registered 
with Admin Authorities.   Homologation powerful 
tool by State to affect bargaining, considers impact 
of agreement on economy and consumers.  1994 
Constitution authorizes the Executive to rescind 
collective agreement or parts thereof for economic 
emergency; State determines legality of strikes and 
presides in mandatory conciliation of disputes and 
can impose mandatory arbitration.    
Monopoly representation by unions with Personería 
Gremial; firm-level unions can only receive PG if 
no sector level union; 7% of unions represent 75% 
of workers. Recent reform to decentralize would 
allow parties to modify level of negotiations, in case 
of disagreement State settles dispute, defaulting to 
lower level.  Unions represent affiliated and non-
affiliated workers. 
Brazil  Centralized, high state intervention mitigated by 
1988 Constitution. Still considered corporatist 
though now through judicial intervention. 
Monopoly in transition: movements towards 
collective autonomy  and efforts to decentralize by 
unions and employers. 
1988 Constitution protected union autonomy; State 
no longer able to confer union status or intervene in 
union administration.  However, intervention still 
exists but enforced through the courts.  Bargaining 
process not regulated though contract is.  State can 
invoke old Labor Code declaring invalid any clause 
of a collective agreement for economic reasons. 
State can initiate mandatory arbitration through 
dissido process in cases of essential services.  
Dissidio process triggers mandatory conciliation 
and arbitration by tri-partite courts. 
1988 Constitution maintained corporatist structure.  
Only one union with sindicato status can represent a 
profession by industry in geographic territory.  The 
law doesn’t allow for firm-based unions.  Sindicatos 
can bargain at firm or sector level; oftentimes 
pursuing a bi-level strategy to avoid the salary limits 
imposed by govt policy.  1988 Constitution provides 
that workers in firms of more than 200 employees 
have right to elect representative to promote direct 
negotiations with employer. 
Chile  Decentralized, mixed state intervention; 
recuperation of collective autonomy with return to 
democratic government, but still intervention in 
conflict resolution. 
Unions formation don’t need state approval, but  
process is regulated, as is internal administration.  
Unions report yearly to state.  Bargaining process 
highly regulated, but allows autonomy in 
negotiations.  Also “unregulated bargaining” 
process but doesn’t carry strike option.  Agreements 
can’t limit employer’s “ability to organize, control, 
and administer the firm”. Parties can opt for 
voluntary mediation or arbitration at any time 
during bargaining.  State can impose mandatory 
arbitration to end abusive strike.   Strike process 
regulated in detail. 
Constitution only protects firm-level bargaining.  
From 1991 multi-employer bargaining is allowed 
(unless enterprise subsidized more than 50% by 
state) to improve coverage rates. Most unions at 
firm-level.  More than 1 union can exist per firm 
and sign their own collective agreement. 1991 
reform establishes right to organize fourth-level  
national trade union organization, centrales. 
Mexico  Decentralized at the industry level. However, 
centralized in that most unions coopted into State 
corporatist structure,  high state intervention 
Main form of intervention is state registration of 
unions and intervention in strikes. Unions outside 
the corporatist structure are frequently not registered 
and strikes suppressed. Bargaining autonomy 
Different types of unions allowed, though most 
firm-level.  However, highly disciplined union 
movement achieves high coordination in bargaining.  
Industry-wide law contracts must be approved by 46 
  General Characteristics  State Intervention  Centralization/Decentralization 
circumvented by unions who satisfy duty to bargain 
by signing minimum agreements. State intervenes in 
conflict resolution through conciliation and 
arbitration boards and by declaring strikes non-
existent.  Negotiation process not highly regulated, 
but integrated with conflict resolution (usually 
occurs in conciliation) in which there is high state 
intervention. 
State.  Few of these.   
Peru  Decentralized, high state intervention.  System 
reformed in 1992 in effort to increase direct 
negotiation and conflict resolution and decrease 
state intervention. 
Intervention in registration of unions and conflict 
resolution.  However, 1992 reform prohibits denial 
of registration unless non-compliance with legal 
requirements.  Also improved room for direct 
negotiations. Pre-1992 reform bargaining system 
was rigid, procedural and trial like, designed for 
State to resolve conflicts if no agreement was 
reached after 8 days conciliation.  Now, conciliation 
process undefined.  State can still intervene to 
review demands and economic records and can 
mandate conciliation, and arbitration if strike last 
too long and threatens firm or sector. Post 1992 
reform, agreements don’t need approval of state, but 
1991 decree prohibits collective agreement from 
granting wage indexation in state enterprises 
replacing existing clauses with mechanisms that 
take into account productivity increases. 
Decentralized. Firm-based unions dominate 
(97.42% at firm level, only 2.4% industry wide.) 
1992 reform allowed more than 1 union per firm; 
most representative union has monopoly power. 
Parties choose level of agreement; if no consensus, 
defaults at firm level. Overwhelmingly, agreements 
signed at firm-level. 
Uruguay  Centralized, low state intervention  Since 1985 repeal of union legislation, collective 
bargaining system unregulated. No law defines or 
requires registration of unions, or governs collective 
bargaining or conflict resolution.  Unions abide by 
provisions in their statutes and collective 
agreements during times of conflict. 
Some firm-based unions, but most industry wide 
because evolved within old framework of tri-partite 
Wage Councils.  Most bargaining sector-wide. If 
more than one union exists and don’t agree to 
negotiate jointly, “most representative union” 
bargains. 
Source: O’Connell, Lesley, “Industrial labor relations systems in Latin America”, IADB, forthcoming. 
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4.2  From legally mandated protection and benefits towards contractual arrangements 
 
A transition from legally mandated protection and benefits towards contractual 
arrangements arising from workplace conditions would make unions and collective 
bargaining the central actors, with the State actively promoting and protecting union 
organization and bargaining 
 
In the post-reform political and economic setting, industrial relations institutions that 
enhance competitiveness economy-wide and at the firm level, gain new significance. The 
nature and design of these systems impact the firm’s (and, at an aggregated level, the 
economy’s) ability to move resources and adopt productive strategies in areas in which 
they have a competitive advantage. The low union membership and low coverage rates of 
collective bargaining reflect the fact that incentives to actively participate in unions and 
to bargain decline when protections are mandated. Furthermore, collective relations at the 
firm level are unimportant where unions have monopoly representation and, therefore, 
the leverage to impulse either economy-wide wage increases and/or legal measures to 
protect workers from unemployment. The reason is that individual firms and their 
workers do not have the leeway needed to attain an agreement better suited to their 
particular situation.    
 
A reduction in the government intervention in the arena of industrial relations means that 
union’s main task becomes to obtain benefits and protections through better contracts at 
firm level, i.e. through bargaining, not legislation and political lobbying. The main 
problem this raises is that the removal of the state from the traditional role of mandating 
protections and benefits has not brought commiserate increase in the state’s protection 
and promotion of collective activities. The political equation is complicated even more by 
the fact that unions have oftentimes, in defense of legitimate though short-term interest of 
their constituencies, opposed government’s stabilization and/or privatization efforts 
aimed at benefiting wider segments of the population.  
 
To promote a more productivity-oriented industrial relations environment, governments 
face two main challenges. First, they must increase their efforts and investments in the 
protection and promotion of collective activities through active enforcement of rights to 
organize and bargain, already enshrined in most Labor Codes. Second, they need to 
redefine their role in conflict management and resolution by giving the parties more 
incentives to meaningfully bargain, most likely by reducing the ability of the labor 
authority to intervene at will.  To this end, two dimensions of industrial relations are 
particularly important: the degree of collective autonomy vs. state intervention of the 
system, and the degree of centralization vs. decentralization of bargaining. 
Autonomy vs. Intervention 
The scope of autonomy that social parties have in organizing, bargaining, and resolving 
conflicts frames the impact of industrial relations on economic performance. State 
intervention can occur at any one of these stages.  It is important to note that intervention 
at one stage distorts autonomy through the entire system, because the arenas of collective 
bargaining are interrelated. Who bargains, what provisions can be negotiated, what 
happens when bargaining strikes a dead end are all important in determining the   48
consequences of a given bargaining structure.  Who bargains is not only determined by 
the legal structure of bargaining, but also by the structure of unions (who has the right to 
represent whom, and if there is a monopoly of representation).  Autonomy in negotiations 
is important in bargaining and conflict resolution. When bargaining fails, strike and 
conflict resolution procedures are generally triggered. If parties can drop the 
consequences of bargaining failure on the labor authority, their calculations will include 
not only economic gains and losses, but also their degree of influence on the 
government’s political agenda.  
 
In both bargaining and conflict resolution, the potential for direct negotiations and the 
extent to which the contracting parties internalize the consequences of their actions are 
key. Most legislation in Latin America sets the labor authority (either the Ministry or the 
special judiciary) as facilitator, mediator, and arbitrator of last resort, with little or no 
rules regarding the scope of intervention or the parameters of the arbitrage resolution. 
This reduces enormously the cost of inflexible and/or disruptive position for both firms 
and unions, thus increasing the need for the arbitration of labor authority in a vicious 
circle.  
 
The introduction of new methods for negotiation management and conflict resolution, 
based on mediation provided by professional third parties, has been successful in 
reducing the level of conflict in industrial relations
27. Also, legislation reform aimed at 
establishing clear and transparent rules for arbitration can create incentives towards more 
productive negotiation conducts. One example is the introduction of final offer arbitration 
methods, where arbitrators are limited to choosing between the last parties’ offers, that 
induce parties to more carefully advance their proposals in the negotiation process. 
Paradoxically, the most important action that governments can adopt to increase the 
autonomy of the parts is to actively intervene to enforce and promote freedom of 
organization and negotiation. To the extent that workers’ benefits and protections are to 
be connected with the evolution of workplace productivity, unions are needed to act as 
collective voice in the bargaining process. This requires changes in the labor authority 
procedures and regulations for union creation and registration aimed at simplifying 
requirements and protecting unions from political interference.  
 
Centralization vs. Decentralization 
 
The policy discussion has largely centered on the issue of decentralization and 
centralization of collective bargaining. The belief that intermediate levels of 
centralization of collective bargaining (at the sector level) are inferior in terms of 
economic performance than completely decentralized (firm level) or centralized (at the 
national level) systems has been a tenet of the economic literature since the seminal 
Calmfors and Driffill 1988 paper
28. Recent evidence and new studies summarized in the 
                                                           
27 Argentina, Mexico, and a number of Central American countries are beginning to implement mediation 
programs with the assistance of the Federal Mediation Agency of the USA.  
28 Calmfors, L. and J. Driffil, “Bargaining structure, corporatism, and economic performance”, Economic 
Policy, April 1988, 14-61   49
1997 OECD Employment Outlook
29 suggest that there is very little robust evidence to 
conclude that intermediate levels of centralization worsen economic and labor market 
performance
30. 
In terms of the policy debate it is reasoned that decentralized bargaining better connects 
collective contract provisions to firm conditions and internalizes the consequences of the  
wage/employment trade-off.  On the other hand, extreme decentralization may produce 
wage drift if there is total absence of coordination.  Both the level at which bargaining 
occur and the degree of coordination between different bargaining units is crucial. 
Germany and some Nordic countries have sector-level bargaining but high coordination 
among both firms and unions negotiation units that effectively produce the coordination 
necessary to avoid leap-frogging between contracts. The experiments with Pactos 
Sociales that generate guidelines for wage increases implemented through the bargaining 
units have been applied both in Mexico (a highly coordinated structure) and in Chile (a 
completely decentralized one) with some success.  
 
5-Issues for Debate 
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that current institutions and regulations 
have been partially successful in reducing the risk of unemployment at the expense of 
increasing self-employment and reducing employment rates for young and female 
workers.  In addition, our evidence uncovers disturbing inequalities in the coverage of 
legally mandated benefits.  
 
These results pose the following questions: 
 
(1)  Should current employment protection mechanisms be substituted by alternative 
mechanisms of protection?  Inequities in the distribution of benefits and distortions in 
the behavior of the labor market are compelling reasons for reform. However, recent 
events, like the South-East crisis, confirm that the demand for protection against 
large macroeconomic shocks is likely to remain a fundamental issue in the region.  
Future reform programs must devise new mechanisms that respond to this demand 
for protection in ways that minimize labor market distortions and expand coverage to 
less advantaged workers. 
 
(2)  Should the region develop unemployment insurance programs that insure 
unemployed workers against temporary income shortfalls? And if so, how should 
these programs be designed and implemented?  An alternative to the current 
employment protection mechanisms based on large dismissal penalties and a bias 
towards indefinite contracts is to insure workers’ income while they are looking for 
an alternative job. This goal can be attained in various ways. Compulsory savings 
mechanisms or Fondos de Cesantia, like the ones existing in Colombia, Ecuador or 
Peru, are good examples of mechanisms that provide supplemental income to an 
unemployed worker without distorting the labor market. Under these mechanisms 
                                                           
29 “Employment Outlook”, OECD, July 1997 
30 The OECD study, however, finds fairly solid evidence of a decrease in earnings inequality related to 
more centralized/coordinated bargaining structures.   50
workers are forced to save part of their monthly income in a personal account that 
accrues market interest rates. The amount accumulated becomes available to the 
worker when the labor relationship is terminated, regardless of which party has 
initiated the separation. This mechanism has the advantage of being fully transparent. 
However, unemployment risk is not pooled across workers since each worker saves 
for her own possible unemployment spell. Another alternative is to develop an 
unemployment insurance system, in which workers and firms contribute to the 
system paying a premium to the insurance administrators. In the event of 
unemployment, the worker receives a benefit during a certain number of periods. 
This system has the advantage that unemployment risk is pooled across workers. 
However, it may be more difficult to administer than a Fondo de Cesantia.  
 
(3)  Should Latin American countries expand the set of contracts available to workers?  
The current protection system biases employment towards more mature and male 
workers. This is partly the result of a system that was designed to protect the head of 
the family. As demands change and workers with a higher need for flexibility enter 
the labor market, new contracts that allow part-time employment but still ensure 
some form of protection should be devised. 
 
(4)  Should social security taxes and payroll deductions be reduced for less advantaged 
workers?  Our results suggest that in small and large firms, poorer, less skilled 
workers are less likely to benefit from the protection of the law, as indicated by the 
evasion of social security contributions. At this stage we cannot identify whether the 
law is evaded because workers choose not to participate, or because firms choose not 
to award them protection. Yet, both explanations suggest that social security 
contributions might be too high for certain groups of workers. Coverage to less 
advantaged workers might be increased through the reduction of social security 
contributions for groups that are more likely to be cash constrained and, therefore, 
place lower value in in-kind benefits.  
 
(5) Should minimum wage policy be reexamined? Should minimum wages for young 
workers be lower than the general minimum wage? Our evidence suggests that 
minimum wages might be contributing to higher youth unemployment rates. In 
setting minimum wages for the youngest workers it should be taken into account that 
wages tend to increase with age and experience and hence youth wages tend to be 
lower than the average. However, in answering these questions the costs and benefits 
of keeping wages artificially high should be carefully balanced. For example, it has 
been suggested that high unemployment rates keep young people in school, 
increasing their future chances to find a good job.  If this effect is important, lowering 
minimum wages might prompt too many young workers to abandon school. Yet, it 
might be argued that this is not the best policy to encourage schooling; Part time 
arrangements or targeted subsidies to the most able students can be superior ways to 
keep young people in school. 
 
Similarly, some authors have stressed the redistribution properties of minimum 
wages. There is evidence for both Latin America and other countries suggesting that   51
higher minimum wages are associated with lower poverty levels
31. However, even if 
minimum wages are an effective way to reduce poverty, they are not necessarily an 
efficient tool for pursuing this objective. Other policies, like negative income tax 
schemes might be more appropriated tools to reduce poverty. 
  
(6) Would it be convenient and feasible to evolve from legally mandated benefits towards 
agreements arising from collective bargaining? To the extent that legally mandated 
benefits and protection both distortion employment and have adverse equity 
implications, the case may be argued for giving a wider role to collective bargaining 
in order to attain a level of protection more amenable to the post-reform economic 
environment. However, given the weakness of the union movement, this evolution 
may lead to a worsening of wages and working conditions. Therefore, one of the 
necessary conditions for this process to take place is an active participation of the 
State in the protection and promotion of the freedom of organization and bargaining. 
 
(7) Should collective bargaining be decentralized at the firm level?  If so, how to avoid 
weakening and fragmentation of union’s bargaining power? It is often argued that the 
highly centralized systems of collective bargaining in the region need to be 
decentralized in order to achieve better labor market outcomes (both in terms of 
efficiency and equity). Unions, in turn, counter-argue that the abandonment of the 
current bargaining structure would weaken their bargaining power and, therefore, 
worsen wages and working conditions. It has been argued that the combination of 
decentralization of collective bargaining and establishment of a tripartite national 
agreement on wage guidelines could create the coordination necessary to avoid 
weakening the bargaining position of workers. 
 
                                                           
31 Lustig and McLeod (1996).   52
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Table 2: The effects of employment protection on employment rates 
(Student’s t in parenthesis under coefficients) 
Dependent variable is:  Employment rate      
        
Protection index  -0.77  -0.67 -0.56 -0.39 -0.68 -0.50 
  (-3.4) (-2.7) (-2.2) (-0.9) (-2.6) (-1.8) 
Change in annual inflation rate  -0.01  -0.01       
   (-0.9)  (-0.8)      
GDP per capita        0.0002     
      (0.3)    
GDP growth rate          -1.54  -2.49 
       (-0.8)  (-1.2) 
Dummy region      -7.64  -6.11    -10.27 
     (-1.4)  (-0.5)  (-1.7) 
Nr.  obs.  34 34 34 27 29 29 
Adj. R
2  0.243 0.24 0.263  0.152 0.159 0.214 
 
Table 3:The effects of employment protection on self- employment  
Dependent variable is:  Share of self-employment on total    
        
Protection index  0.63 0.57 0.38 0.56     
  (5.2) (5.0) (2.4) (3.3)     
Change in annual inflation rate  0.02         
   (2.2)        
GDP per capita      -0.0005       
     (-2.5)     
GDP growth rate        -0.43     
       (-0.3)    
Dummy  region      1.96    
      (0.6)    
Nr.  obs.  24 24 23 22     
Adj. R
2  0.531 0.601 0.659 0.502     
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Time-Series estimates for Chile 
 








































































































































(*)  All dependent variables are measured as %  of working age population  and in growth rates. Standard errors in the parenthesis 
 
 










































































































































(*)  All dependent variables are measured as %  of working age population  and in growth rates. Standard errors in the parenthesis 
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Time-Series estimates for Chile 
 
 
Table 8: Results for female  population 15-65 years old. Sample:1960-1996 
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